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Persecution: How Much is Enough?
HillaryR. Chambers
INTRODUCTION
Nabil Dandan, from Lebanon, is the husband of Ketty Dandan and the father
of four children.2 The Dandan family lived in Dubai for eleven years, where Nabil
worked as an accountant, until the United Arab Emirates cancelled the family's
visas.' When the Dandans were forced to move back to Lebanon, the country was
in the midst of a civil war.4 A "green line" divided the capital city of Beirut-the
Maronite Christians, part of the Eastern Rite affidiation of the Roman Catholic
Church, resided on the east side of the line, and the Muslim part of the population,
comprised of both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, lived on the west side of the line.
5
The Christian and Muslim segments of the population began fighting, and each
group gathered private militias for defense in 1975.6
As Maronite Christians, Nabil and his family resided near East Beirut.
7
Because there were no private employers, he accepted employment with the
Lebanese Christian Forces as an accountant and tax collector.8 He worked for the
Lebanese Christian Forces in an area near the border of East and West Beirut.9 On
June 3, 1989, Nabil was kidnapped by the Syrian forces while on his way home
from work." ° He testified that he was deprived of food, beaten, and interrogated
during his three-day detention."' According to Nabil's testimony, the Syrians
wanted the names of those who were supporting the Lebanese Christian Forces.'
2
He told the Syrians everything he knew, but, Nabil did not possess the type of
information someone of a "higher political status" would possess.'3
In order for Nabil to be released, his wife was forced to pay ransom money
through a Syrian mediator.' 4 When he was finally released by the Syrian forces,
' University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. expected May 2016.
2 Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2003).
3 Id.
41d.
5 Id.
6Id.
7 Id.
' Id. at 570 -71.
' Id. at 571.
1° Id "
11id.
13 Id.
14 Id"
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Nabil's face "was swollen because [his kidnappers] beat [him]." 5 He testified that
after he was released the Dandan family's home was shelled, partially destroying the
home and causing his family to move from shelter to shelter for almost two months
during the summer of 1989.16 Nabil understandably decided to flee Lebanon with
his family, taking his wife and children at night to Cyprus, where they obtained
visas for the United States. 7 The Dandans arrived in the United States on August
10, 1989.18
One month later, Nabil applied for asylum in the United States. 9 After several
delays, a hearing was held on October 11, 2000, on the merits of Dandan's claim
for asylum.2" The judge denied relief. The immigration judge found that, although
Dandan was a credible witness, the three-day detention did not constitute
persecution within the meaning of the asylum statute. 21 The immigration judge
also found that the Country Report showed a change in the country's conditions
such that Dandan could no longer have an objectively reasonable, well-founded fear
of future persecution within the meaning of the asylum statute. 22 Nabil's timely
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") was dismissed by a 2-1
decision.23 Like the immigration judge, the BIA stated that Nabil's three-day
detention did not constitute past persecution, nor did it establish that he had a
well-founded fear of future persecution at the time of the hearing.
24
As a last resort, Nabil appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
2
1
However, because Nabil was only subject to a single detention, without more, the
court was not compelled to find that he was subject to past persecution.26 The court
reasoned that the frequency of the alleged harm inflicted is a significant factor in
the persecution analysis to determine whether an individual will be granted asylum
in the United States.27 Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Nabil's
three-day detention, beatings, and deprivation of food was "quite serious," the court
ultimately concluded the level of severity of a single occurrence was not high
enough in Nabil's case to find past persecution.2" The court suggested it might be
compelled to reverse the Board's decision and find past persecution if Nabil had
15 Id.
16Id.
17 Id.
18Id.
19 Id.
2' Id. at 572.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 570, 572.
23 Id. at 572.
24 Id.
25 See id
2 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
27 See id.
RId. at 573-74.
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presented evidence that he had lost teeth or broken a bone during the detention. 29
These are the sort of trivial details upon which the courts in the United States base
their decisions in asylum cases. Courts are forced to engage in and rely upon this
type of analysis because there is no standard for determining when an asylum
applicant has suffered persecution, which is a necessary element of the asylum
statute.
30
This Note focuses on a specific issue within the most ambiguous element to be
proven in order for an alien to be granted asylum in the United States.31 That
element is "persecution," and the issue is whether a remote occurrence or a series of
isolated incidents can constitute past persecution for the purposes of the asylum
statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) provides the statutory basis for asylum claims and
explicitly uses 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)'s definition of refugee to specify those
individuals eligible for asylum.
32
The statutory definition of refugee was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980
and states, in relevant part:
[A]ny person who is outside the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.""0
Accordingly, the standard for asylum may be broken down into four elements:
(1) the applicant must be outside his or her home country, (2) the applicant must
have been persecuted or fear future persecution in his or her home country;, (3) the
government of the applicant's home country must offer no protection from the
persecution; and (4) the persecution must be on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.34 The
grounds listed in element four are most commonly referred to as protected grounds.
It is critical to correctly determine whether past persecution has occurred
because a finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution and shifts the burden of
9 See id. at 574.
3 See Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 283-84 (2013).
31 While "alien" is a loaded term in the mainstream media, this piece will continue to use the word
"alien" because that is the language that the Immigration and Nationality Act uses. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) (2014).
32 Daniel J. Smith, Political Asylum-Well-Founded Fear of Persecution, 13 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of
Facts § 2,Westlaw (database updated December 2015).
33 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102-03 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. 1101(a) (2009)).34 Id.
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proof to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS). 35 "Proof of past
persecution alone has been found to satisfy the objective component, so as to bring
an applicant within the definition of a refugee, and thus establish eligibility for
asylum."36 Despite the fact that thousands of decisions, and in turn the lives of
thousands of applicants and their families, hinge on the meaning of persecution
within the refugee statute, a consistent definition for the term has yet to be
established.37
Much deference is given to the decisions made and standards set by the BIN. 35
Therefore, this Note urges the BIA to take a firm position on whether, and under
what circumstances, isolated incidents will constitute persecution for the purposes
of obtaining asylum in the United States. This Note also encourages immigration
judges, the BIA, and United States federal courts to establish a universal standard
and method of analyzing persecution issues. The human-rights-based approach
used by several other countries invokes international law and would be a more
successful method, producing more fair outcomes for parties involved.
Section One will provide background information and briefly explain the
process an applicant must go through to gain asylum status in the United States.
An explanation of these procedural aspects will be helpful to contextualize the case
law found in Sections Two and Three. Section Two discusses the multitude of
cases in which courts ruled against granting asylum in the United States after
finding that remote occurrences or isolated incidents did not rise to the level of
persecution required. Section Three examines the cases in which courts have found
that a remote occurrence or a series of isolated incidents constitutes persecution.
Section Four evaluates other sources that provide guidance for interpreting what
constitutes "past persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Section Five will
set forth an argument for the United States adopting a human rights-based
approach similar to that used by other countries.
The current approach used in the United States to determine what constitutes
persecution under the asylum statute is unclear and unpredictable; it often results in
unfair outcomes for applicants who are in dire need of protection. These variable
and often unfair outcomes are a result of the various and differing sources of
authority used by immigration judges, BIA, and U.S. federal courts. The outcome
of an applicant's case largely depends on the standard used by the particular
adjudicator. This Note will urge the authorities in the United States to establish a
concrete standard for persecution, and will suggest the human-rights-based analysis
" See id. While immigration issues were previously under the purview of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, these functions were transferred to U.S. Citizenship Immigration Services
(USCIS), located in the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history (last accessed Mar. 21, 2016).
3 Smith, supra note 32, § 3.
7 Rempell, supra note 31, at 283-84.
See Ratnasingam v. Holder, 556 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2009).
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that several other countries have already found successful as a suitable replacement
standard to the current one.
I. BACKGROUND
The asylum application process begins most commonly with the
commencement of a removal proceeding by DHS. If the petitioner, the alien
against whom the removal proceeding was filed, wishes to remain in the United
States, he or she must first file an application for asylum.39 "The [Department]
shall adjudicate the claim of each asylum applicant whose application is complete
within the meaning of § 208.3(c)(3) and is within the jurisdiction of the
[Department]."'
Before an asylum hearing can be scheduled, the applicant must attend an
interview with an asylum officer for the purpose of determining the applicant's
eligibility.41 Next, assuming the applicant is found eligible, an asylum hearing may
be scheduled. A hearing on the merits is held before an immigration judge.4 2 At
this hearing, the applicant may testify as to past persecution or to fear of future
persecution.43 At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge will either
grant or deny the application for asylum based on the judge's assessment of the
applicant's credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence presented.'
If the immigration judge denies the application for asylum, the applicant may
appeal to the BIA.45 The Board will review the case and will either affirm the
immigration judge's denial of the application or grant asylum status."' The
applicant may then bring his or her objections to the immigration judge's and the
Board's decisions to the proper federal Court of Appeals.47 When BIA has chosen
to entirely adopt an immigration judge's reasoning and decision, the federal court
will review the immigration judge's decision directly and determine whether BLA.'s
adoption should be upheld.'
Initially, the burden of proof is on the applicant.49 If the testimony of the
applicant is found to be credible, it "may be sufficient to sustain that burden of
"9 See Form of Application, 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) (2015); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009); see also Gilaj v.
Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2005).
o Procedure for Interview Before an Asylum Officer, 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(a) (2015).
41 See id. § 208.9(b).
42 See id. § 208.9(b); Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 280.
43 See 8 C.F.R § 208.9(b); Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 280.
' See Approval, Denial, Referral, or Dismissal of Application, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a) (2015); Gilaj,
408 F.3d at 281.
5 See Appeals, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15 (2016); see also Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 281.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(a); Gilj, 408 F.3d at 281.
47 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2011).
4 Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 282-83.
41 Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2015); see also Chatta v. Mukasey, 523
F.3d 748, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2008).
2015-2016]
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proof without corroboration." ° Applicants must provide credible evidence "that
[the applicant] (1) is statutorily eligible for asylum because [the applicant] is a
'refugee,' and (2) merits a favorable exercise of discretion on the part of the
Attorney General" to obtain asylum under United States law "' This Note is
concerned solely with the statutory eligibility for asylum based upon the refugee
definition provided by the United States Code.52 "[T]he burden is on the applicant
to establish that he [or she] is a refugee." 3 "A refugee is a person who is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country because of past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution because of his race, religion, nationality,
memberchip in a particular social group, or his political opinion." 4
An asylum applicant must present specific facts to show past persecution or
good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution in the future.
5
If the immigration judge or the BIA finds that sufficient specific facts have not
been presented, an appellate court will not disturb that finding "unless the evidence
is 'so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to f'md the requisite fear of
persecution.
'"s6
The immigration judge may exercise his or her discretion and deny an asylum
application if during the application process a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that the situation in the applicant's home country has fundamentally
changed so as to invalidate the claim of persecution or that the applicant could
avoid future persecution by relocating to a different area of his home country.
57
Determining whether isolated incidents may constitute an event of past persecution
is the focus here, not the determination of well founded fear of persecution in the
future. To be clear, this fear is what is actually required, while a showing of past
persecution creates a presumption of such fear.5" After this showing, the burden of
proof shifts back to the government to establish a change in circumstances in the
applicant's home country or the possibility for the applicant to simply relocate in
his or her home country.
59
'0 8 C.F.R § 208.13(a).
" Chatta, 523 F.3d at 751-52.
52 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2011).
13 Chatta, 523 F.3d at 752.54 Id.
ss See id.
56 Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992); Sayaxing v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d
515,519 (7th Cir. 1999)).
57 Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B) (2015).
51 Smith, supra note 32, § 2.
5' 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii).
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11. CASES FINDING THAT A REMOTE OCCURRENCE OR A SERIES OF
ISOLATED INCIDENTS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PERSECUTION
There are several cases determining that a remote occurrence or series of
isolated incidents do not constitute persecution. In a recent case, Thapaliya v.
Holder, thc Firot Circuit held that the severe beating of the applicant, a nativo and
citizen of Nepal, was an isolated event insufficient to establish past persecution.
60
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that "establishing past persecution..
. can be a 'daunting task' for which petitioners 'bear a heavy burden.'"' Thapaliya
testified that a group of Maoist-rebels beat him severely and pointed a gun at him
in his home because of his involvement with an anti-Maoist political group as a
student-member.62 Even assuming that the pointing of a gun by the persecutors
was an implied death threat, the court said that a "single threat during [a] single
beating still is not enough to compel a conclusion of past persecution."63 The First
Circuit considered factors such as "the severity, duration, and frequency of physical
abuse," but ultimately denied the applicant's petition.
64
Similarly, in Ratnasingam v. Holder, the First Circuit found that the applicant
was not subjected to past persecution in Sri Lanka. 65 Although Ratnasingam
testified to four fear-invoking, threatening events, the court said, "The record
simply does not compel the conclusion that Ratnasingam 'was subjected to
sygtematic maltreatment rising to the level of persecution, as opposed to a series of
isolated incidents.'" 66
The first incident occurred in the summer of 2001, when three men in army
uniforms aggressively approached Ratnasingam as he returned to his shop after a
wedding. His persecutors took him to a camp and proceeded to question him for
three hours about various individuals in photographs. 67 Ratnasingam stated that he
was unable to answer their questions because he did not take the photographs.
68
The men also asked whether he or his family supported the Liberation Tamil
Tigers of Eelam ("LTTE"), a Tamil separatist group. 69 Ratnasingam denied any
involvement, but the men held him captive until the next day.7"
' Thapaliya v. Holder, 750 F.3d 56, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2014).
61 Id. at 59 (citing Butt v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2007)).
62 Id. at 57-58.
63 Id. at 60.
64 Id. at 59-61.
" Ratnasingam v. Holder, 556 F.3d 10, 14-15 (lst Cir. 2009).
6 Id. at 12-14 (quoting Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cit. 2005)).
67 Id. at 12.
68Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
20IS-2016]
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Four years later, a group of LTTE members instructed Ratnasingam not to
videotape any political functions", and they threatened him that if he told anyone
about the encounter, they would tell the Sri Lankan army that he was involved with
the LTTE.72 The next year, Ratnasingam's brother-in-law was killed near an army
camp.
73
Finally, in 2007, Ratnasingam received anonymous telephone calls from
someone demanding money and threatening Ratnasingam's death if he contacted
the police.74 All of those detailed incidents were not enough to convince the court
that Ratnasingam had suffered persecution.
7
1
The applicant in Topalli v. Gonzales was arrested, detained, and beaten seven
times on account of his political beliefs. 76 Although the First Circuit did note that
this was a dose case, the court was still unable to conclude that the applicant "was
subjected to systematic maltreatment rising to the level of persecution, as opposed
to a series of isolated events."
77
In Dandan v. Ashcroft, as mentioned in this Note's Introduction, the Seventh
Circuit held that the applicant did not suffer past persecution when Syrian forces
detained him for three days without food and he was beaten until his face became
swollen.78 While the court at least recognized the possibility for a single incident to
constitute past persecution, it viewed the frequency of events simply as a factor in
the analysis. 71 "Although the frequency issue is not dispositive, it does figure
significantly in the analysis. However, this court has on occasion based a finding of
past persecution on a single episode of detention or physical abuse."8 °
In Prasad v. LN.S., the applicant contended that he was driving his taxi when a
group of Fijians, some dressed in military uniforms.8' The Fijians stopped him and
took him to the police station, where he was placed in a jail cell.82 During his
containment, Prasad was hit in the stomach, kicked from behind, and questioned
about supporting the ethnic Indian-led Labour Party.83 Several hours later, he was
finally released.84 The interaction made Prasad feel that if he continued to actively
support the Labour Party, a similar arrest and beating would occur.8" In that case,
71 Id.
7
2Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 13-14.
76 Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (lst Cir. 2005).
7Id.
' Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003).
79 See id. at 573.
go Id.
" Prasad v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 Id.
8 Id.
84Id.
85Id.
[Vol. 104
Persecution: How Much is Enough?
the Ninth Circuit did not find enough evidence in the record to conclude that a
reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find sufficient evidence to establish
past persecution, though such a factfinder certainly could have found such
evidence.
8 6
These cases are concerning, and there are countless others just like them
These cases are concerning because the applicants do have legitimate reasons to
fear lack of protection in their home countries, yet they cannot gain asylum in the
United States because the persecution they experienced was a remote occurrence or
a series of isolated events. The harmful incidents that those seeking asylum have
experienced would be considered persecution by most under the plain meaning of
the word, so it is difficult to understand why the courts, more often than not, find
otherwise.
l1l. CASES FINDING THAT A REMOTE OCCURRENCE OR A SERIES OF
ISOLATED INCIDENTS DOES CONSTITUTE PERSECUTION
There are also some cases finding that a remote occurrence of a series of
isolated incidents do constitute persecution. Beskovic v. Gonzales involved two
isolated events in which Serbian police, arrested the applicant and detained,
interrogated, and beat him.87 The Second Circuit discussed the need to take into
consideration the context surrounding isolated incidents to determine whether or
not such incidents constitute persecution."8 The court noted that in a case such as
Beskovic, where the applicant was detained, physically abused, mistreated, and
degraded, "the BIA and individual [immigration judges] must be sensitive to the
obvious reality that such detention and physical mistreatment are usually
correlative, not coincidental.89 Further, the court said that even though in other
contexts mistreatment could be reasonably characterized as "the mere annoyance
and distress" of harassment, the BIA and immigration judges must be sensitive to
the fact that such mistreatment can, and often should, cause the court to come to a
different outcome when the alien is detained and abused on account of protected
grounds. 9 "In other words, while 'the difference between harassment and
persecution is necessarily one of degree,' the degree must be assessed with regard to
the context in which the mistreatment occurs."9 Doing just that, the Second
Circuit granted the petition for review.
92
"AId. at 339.
7 Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cit. 2006).
'"See id. at 226-27.
Id. at 226.
See id. (quoting Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep't ofJust., 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir. 2006)).
91 Id. (quoting Ivanishvii, 433 F.3d at 341).
92 Id. at 227.
20IS-2016]
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Manzur v. US. Department of Homeland Security further discusses the need
to evaluate the context surrounding isolated incidents.93 There, the Second Circuit
provided two reasons why the harm to the applicant is significant: "First,
accumulation of harm from the individual incidents may rise to the level necessary
for persecution even though an individual incident may not. Second, 'the motive
for the harm inflicted must be analyzed in light of the context in which the harm
occurred.'"9 4 Considering context surrounding the harm that resulted from the
alleged persecution may provide evidence to support a conclusion that isolated
incidents were "on account of" protected grounds.9" It is misleading to evaluate
isolated events out of context because, as context is the factor that often causes a
harmful event to constitute persecution.96
The Sixth Circuit looked at applicant testimony concerning isolated incidents
in the aggregate in order to find that such incidents constituted past persecution. in
Gilaj v. Gonzales.97 The petitioner in that case, Mrs. Gilaj, was an active member
of the Democratic Party in Albania, and was first threatened by police during her
involvement with a campaign for Democratic Party candidates.9" On election day,
her husband's was struck in the neck by a knife during a physical confrontation
with Socialists." The next year, the police beat Mrs. Gilaj during a search for
weapons in her home, telling her they did not need a search warrant because "they
were Socialists who were going to make all Democrats suffer."1"' After the search,
these same police arrested Mrs. Gilaj's son, jailed him for two days, and beat
hin. 101
In early 2000, after Mrs. Gilaj spoke at an anti-government demonstration she
had helped to organize, "she and her family received phone calls at home from
unidentified people threatening that the family would 'pay dearly for her speech at
the demonstration." 11 2 Several days after the demonstration, police came to the
Gilaj home and told Mrs. Gilaj they were going to kill her.13 When two relatives
came into the house, the police were molesting her.0 4
On a separate occasion, Mrs. Gilaj was arrested and detained for two days for
her participation in another demonstration.0 5 During the detention, Mrs. Gilaj
" See Manzur v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir. 2007).
14 Id. (quoting Uwais v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 478 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2007)).
9' See id
9 Id.
97 Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 287 (6th Cir. 2005).
98 Id. at 280.
9 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
1
04 See id.
'os Id. at 281.
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was beaten and deprived of food. 6 Mrs. Gilaj and her family fled to the United
States for refuge.'1 7 After reviewing the facts of the case, the court stated:
When all of the incidents to which petitioners testified are taken into account and
considered in the aggregate and in light of the overall context of the Gilaj family's
situation, the record compels a finding that Mrs. Gilaj was subjected by her
government to past persecution on account of political activities and opinion.'
The applicant in Bracic v. Holder testified to being called a traitor, beaten, and
kicked until he temporarily lost consciousness.' ° 'When Bracic later saw one of the
men who had attacked him in a police uniform outside his home, he fled and never
returned home. ° The Eighth Circuit looked to the record as a whole and, even
under the stringent substantial evidence standard of review, disagreed with the
immigration judge's finding that Bracic had not suffered past persecution."' The
court came to the opposite conclusion as the immigration judge because the factual
surroundings of the incidents amounted to much more than mere mistreatment,
and considered cumulatively provided compelling evidence that the applicant did in
fact suffer past persecution.
2
In Corado v. Ashcroft, the Eighth Circuit found that a death threat on account
of political opinion is not outside the definition of "persecution" simply because it
occurs during a single event." 3 The Eighth Circuit has "consistently .. .defined
persecution to include 'the infliction or threat of death' on account of a factor
enumerated in the statute, without any suggestion of a 'pattern and practice'
requirement.""' The court's opinion in Corado is an example of a court not only
allowing a claim of persecution to stand without require the harm to be systematic,
but also allowing such a claim without requiring physical harm at all. To the
Corado court, a serious threat was enough.
In Vaduva v. I.N.S., the applicant was able to provide enough testimony to
establish past persecution based on a single event.11 Although Vaduva's application
was denied on other grounds, a single beating was enough for the court to find that
he experienced past persecution." 6 In a similar case, an applicant's fifteen-day
106Id.
107 See id.
"Id. at 287.
'o"Bracic v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1027, 1035-36 (8th Cir. 2010).
nId. at 1036.
111 Id. at 1035.
112 Id. at 1035-36.
113 See Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir. 2004).
114 Id.
"' Vaduva v. I.N.S., 131 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Michael English, Distinguishing
True Persecution from Legitimate Prosecution in American Asylum Law, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 109, 122
(2007).
.. Vaduva, 131 F.3d at 692.
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detention and two beatings were also sufficient to constitute past persecution under
the asylum statute." 7
Reviewing all of these cases as a whole, it is clear that some federal circuit courts
are willing to interpret more leniently the unclear requirement that incidents of
harm be systematic or part of a pattern in order to constitute past persecution.
However, there are also some circuits that insist that the petitioner show that the
alleged persecution is systematic. As this Note argues, some harm is so severe, and
some events are so significant when evaluated in the surrounding context, that it is
unfair and unreasonable for a court not to find past persecution only because the
harm came from an isolated incident.
IV. SOURCES OF GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF "PAST
PERSECUTION" UNDER 8 U.S.C § l101(A)(42)(A)
The term "persecution" is not defined in the statutes, regulations, or the
USCIS's Operations Instructions.' While the United Nations Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ("Handbook") notes that
"there is no universally accepted definition of 'persecution,'" it offers some
direction by further providing that "a threat to life or freedom ... can constitute
persecution". 119 The Handbook introduces a subjective element to the
determination of persecution:
Whether other prejudicial actions or threats would amount to persecution will
depend on the circumstances of each case, including the subjective element ....
The subjective character of fear of persecution requires an evaluation of the
opinions and feelings of the person concerned. It is also in the light of such
opinions and feelings that any actual or anticipated measures against him must
necessarily be viewed. Due to variations in the psychological makeup of
individuals and in the circumstances of each case, interpretations of what amounts
to persecution are bound to vary.'
Although BIA has not set forth a solid definition of persecution, it has named
two significant aspects of persecution.' The first aspect is the reasoning behind
the harm caused by the persecutor.'22 The persecutor must inflict the harm to
punish the persecuted individual for a belief or characteristic that the persecutor
17 English, supra note 113, at 122.
... Smith, supra note 32, § 4. The USCIS's Operating Instructions are one of many documents that
provide guidance to the agency's personnel and provide internal administration information. See, e.g.
USCIS Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMBIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2016).
119 United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status, 51 (Dec. 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html.
Id. (52).
m See Smith, supra note 32, § 4.
'2 See id.
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seeks to overcome.' 23 The second significant aspect concerns who inflicts the
harm.124 The persecutor must be either the government of a country or persons or
an organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control. 12 The BIA
has also implied that the persecution must be organized or persistent, as opposed to
random acts of violence.
26
V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADOPT A UNIVERSAL STANDARD
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN ASYLUM APPLICANT HAS
SUFFERED PAST PERSECUTION
A. Current State of the Law in the United States
There is a trend in BIA decisions not to recognize remote occurrences or a
series of isolated incidents as sufficient evidence to show past persecution. In turn,
the BIA usually does not find a legitimate fear of future persecution even when
such incidents are particularly violent and fear-invoking. The fact that incidents are
isolated is a common reason provided by immigration judges and the BIA to deny
asylum to applicants seeking refuge in the United States. This often results in an
unfair outcome when the event or events actually did cause a well-founded fear of
persecution in the future.
The courts give a great amount of deference to the BIA due to the Chevron
deference principle.' 27 This principle further bolsters the argument that the BIA
should take a more solid and clear position on defining persecution and state an
exception to the isolated incidents trend. This exception should allow certain
incidents that involve a high level of harm to constitute persecution under the
statute, even when the harm is not systematic or persistent. If the United States
authorities changed paths and started applying a human-rights-based analysis, the
problem of unfair outcomes in cases where the applicant is turned down solely
because his or her persecution occurred in the form of a remote occurrence or an
isolated incident would be solved.
Despite the high level of deference given to the BIA, courts do "require a
certain minimum level of analysis from the [immigration judge] and BIA opinions
denying asylum, and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be
meaningful."' The federal circuit courts certainly possess the authority to vacate
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that with regard to judicial review of an agency's construction of a statute that it administers, if
Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute).
"z Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005).
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BIA and immigration judge decisions where the reasoning, fact-finding process, or
application of legal standards is clearly flawed. 9 The problem with determining
whether persecution has occurred under the asylum statute is that there is no clear,
proper legal standard when the harm occurred during a remote occurrence or a
series of isolated incidents. Therefore, the main source of guidance for the courts is
BIA, an agency that has yet to take a clear position.
B. Why There Was No Initial Definition of Persecution
Originally, the drafters of the United Nations Refugee Convention purposefully
chose not to define persecution so as to allow the term to be interpreted with
flexibility and to evolve."3 "As one commentator explains, 'the Convention was
written with the intent to ...protect all persons (and groups) then existing in
Europe who had been or were likely to be the victims of persecution. No forms of
persecution were intentionally excluded.'"' 3' It makes little sense to compose and
utilize some concrete, exclusionary list of harms that constitute persecution because,
unfortunately, it "is a concept only too readily filled by the latest examples of one
person's inhumanity to another."'32 The entire purpose of asylum law should be to
offer protection to those legitimately fleeing persecution, not to conform to
arbitrary trends. Thus in the author's opinion, not granting refugee status to
someone who has experienced persecution in the form of a remote occurrence or a
series of isolated incidents does not serve the goals of asylum law. After all, that
occurrence or series of incidents could have been unimaginably harmful and fear-
invoking.
"Protection from persecution is at the heart of the international refugee
regime."'33 This exact rationale is why it is surprising and concerning that a set
definition of the term persecution is nonexistent. It is one thing if the lack of a
definition for the term is so that persecution can be interpreted broadly to cover
unexpected situations. However, it is something entirely different when the lack of
a definition is due to the desire to exclude certain types of persecution, when in
reality the type of persecution being excluded is extremely harmful and based on a
protected ground under the asylum statute.
According to the United Nations Refugee Convention, there is a bifurcated
framework for determining persecution that is comprised of two key elements.
1 4
2 Manzur v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 2007).
11o DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:2, Westlaw (database
updated October 2015).
.31 Id. (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Persecution" in United States Asylum
Law, 3 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 5, 11 (1991)).
112 Id. (quoting GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL &JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 93-94 (3d ed. 2007)).
'33 Id. § 4:1.34 See id.
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The two elements of the framework are: (1) serious harm and (2) a failure of state
protection."5 Accordingly, the kind of persecution required to gain asylum "is
widely recognized as 'the sustained or systemic denial of human rights
demonstrative of a failure of state protection." 3 6 This framework for determining
persecution is known as the human-rights-based approach to defining and
analyzing persecution. 1
37
C. The Problem with the United States'Approach
Typically, the United States' approach to defining, analyzing, and making
decisions with regard to persecution in the asylum law context deviates significantly
from the human-rights-based approach. "[T]he U.S. approach to interpreting
persecution has generally been ad hoc."13' Because courts in the United States
decide asylum cases, specifically cases on the issue of persecution, on a case-by-case
basis, the most common source for courts to look to for guidance are trends from
prior cases decided by immigration judges, BIA, and other federal courts.
Currently, the most common of these trends is that "U.S. courts have held that
'[m]ere harassment' or 'isolated incidents' of harassment or intimidation do not
generally rise to the level of persecution."' 39 Thus, rather than evaluating situations
presented by various cases on the basis of social norms and humanitarian ideals,
case law in the United States requires the persecution to be systematic.'
4 °
The United States' approach has created much confusion in this area of law,
and the case law is more of a maze than a dear guide on what exactly is required for
an applicant's harmful experiences to constitute persecution under the law. Some
courts have implied that the general principles of international law should be
applied by describing persecution as suffering or harm that is inflicted "in a manner
condemned by civilized governments." 4' Other courts have utilized international
human rights principles or documents as interpretive authority.142 Some courts do
not even treat persecution as a distinct concept, even though it is clearly a distinct
element to be proven in an asylum case.' 43 Those particular courts generally
conduct their analysis on the basis of questions concerning "standard of risk, nexus,
and grounds."'" It is not uncommon for a court to describe persecution is an
135 Id.
136 Id. (quoting JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS
183 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2014)).
137 See id.
138 Id.
' Id. § 4:4.
140Id.
141 Id. (quoting Kane v. Holder, 581 F.3d 231, 238 n.19 (5th Cir. 2009)).
142Id.
143 See id.
144 Id
"
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"extreme" concept, meaning that it is by its nature not meant to encompass a broad
swath of individuals. 45
It is easy to imagine the many ways in which the sources of authority
mentioned above might often contradict one another and leave courts with an
extremely difficult task in deciding which concepts should be applied and which
ones should be compromised or completely ignored. The original draft of the
United Nations Refugee Convention and other early refugee protection
instruments were written in a manner that would hopefuly exclude applicants that
were seeking asylum for reasons of mere "personal convenience.""4 The definitions
and the methods of interpreting "persecution" seems to have changed as the
number of individuals possessing a real need for the protection and originally
intended to be provided by asylum in the United States has been growing. Certain
interests are essential to human dignity, and those interests should be the point
around which the standard for persecution revolves and the definition of
persecution evolves.
147
Although the courts in the United States have recognized to some extent that
international human rights norms are relevant in deciding whether an applicant's
harm suffered or fear of harm in the future amounts to persecution, the courts
should decide collectively how this issue is to be resolved so a uniform standard can
be applied, and the standard and source of authority for that standard can be crystal
clear. In the current state of this area of law, and particularly in relation to the
persecution standard, it would be easy for courts to find fewer and fewer asylum
applicants to be eligible for refugee status simply because of outside forces, or even
internal opinions, that are pushing for less immigration into the United States.
What is stopping a judge from turning to the source of authority or following the
trend that will result in the outcome he or she views as most desirable? Although
this is a concern that is hotly debated in all areas of the law, surely the risk is much
higher when there exists an abundance of sources of authority that are all saying
different things. Such conflicting sources make it much easier for a judge to provide
reasoning to support any number of outcomes.
D. How Cases Would Be Decided Differently
Under the Human -Righ ts-Based Approach
Looking back to the above-mentioned cases in which courts found that a
remote occurrence or a series of isolated incidents did not constitute persecution
under the asylum statute, it is quite likely those cases would have been decided
differently under the human-rights-based approach. The credible testimony in
145 Id.
'" Id. § 4:2 (quoting Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Annex I, pt. I, § C,
2, Dec. 15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 3).
" See ia
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Thapaliya v. Holder that the applicant was severely beaten and threatened by a gun
in his home because of his political affiliation would likely be considered
persecution under such a standard.1" Although the harm occurred in the form of
one isolated event, the applicant was physically hurt and lived in fear because of the
attackers actions and the threat made.1 49 The experience should be considered
sufficiently serious in nature to constitute a severe violation of basic human
rights.1
5 0
In Topalli v. Gonzales, the applicant's detention and seven beatings on account
of political belief surely would have constituted persecution, even though the First
Circuit found that the "isolated events" did not rise to the level of persecution.
1 51
Under a flexible standard based on human rights law, two main criteria are
required: serious harm and a lack of state protection. 52 Seven separate occasions of
beatings and detention constitute serious harm under any definition of the term,
and it is clear that there was no form of state protection. It is hard to see how those
two requirements would not be met in the Topalli case.
Similarly, in Dandan v. Ashcroft, the applicant's three-day detention, which
involved severe beatings and the deprivation of food, would meet the two human
rights requirements.' 53 There, the applicant was beaten until his face became
swollen, which shows that the harm was serious.'5 4 There was no state protection
because the country was in a state of civil war.' Therefore, the harm would rise to
the level of persecution in order to gain refugee status under the human-rights-
based approach.
The same is true for Prasad v. LN.S., where the applicant was taken to jail, hit,
kicked, and intensely questioned.156 There is no imaginable way that harm
involving detention, accusations, and physical acts of hitting and kicking could be
categorized as less than serious." As long as the harm was caused due to some
protected ground, it would almost certainly constitute persecution under the
human-rights-based method; the harm was serious and there was a lack of state
" See Thapaliya v. Holder, 750 F.3d 56, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2014).
149 See id.
"s See ANKER, supra note 127, § 4:3. The international human-rights-based approach to
determining whether action constitutes persecution requires: (1) a universal but flexible standard; (2)
serious harm and a lack of state protection; and (3) sufficiently serious harm. Although there is no set
list of harms, "[v]iolations of physical integrity, 'threats to life or freedom,' and violations of certain
fundamental human rights constitute persecution." Id. (citing § 4:5). Since the applicant in Thapaiya
experienced a violation of physical integrity, a threat to his life or freedom, and the beating violated his
fundamental human rights, this would suffice under the human-rights-based standard.
, See Topalliv. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005).
112 ANKER, supra note 127, § 4:3.
s Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003).
154 See id. at 574.
15s See id. at 572.
156 Prasad v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995).
157 See id.
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protection.'58 Thus, the harm would have satisfied the bifurcated framework of the
human-rights-based approach.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate problem in fairly deciding asylum applications in the United
States at this time is that there is no uniform standard for determining whether an
asylum applicant has suffered past persecution; there are no set guidelines for the
courts to apply in making a persecution decision. The case law shows there are
individuals who seek refuge in the United States by applying for asylum but are
denied refugee status because the harm they have suffered occurred during a remote
occurrence or a series of isolated incidents. Although there is no concrete definition
of persecution, and the BIA has not formally taken a position on the particular
issue, the United States authorities, for the most part, follow the same trend. The
trend is that harm must be systematic or part of a pattern, but the case law also
shows that some courts do find persecution even where the harm is isolated.
This area of immigration law is in a state of confusion and unpredictability.
One standard should be used in all cases, and the best way for that to be
accomplished is for BIA to set that standard. The human-rights-based approach
has been successfil in other countries, and it would prove to decrease the number
of cases in the United States resulting in unfair outcomes.
158 See id.
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